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# STUDY PROJECT

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## ACTIVE ARMY PERCEPTIONS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SUBSEQUENT TO OPERATION DESERT STORM

BY

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ACTIVE ARMY PERCEPTIONS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD  
SUBSEQUENT TO OPERATION DESERT STORM

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

BY

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## ABSTRACT

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In an era of increased competition for scarce resources and in the face of mandated downsizing of the force structure, the number and type of Army National Guard units, the amount, and the type of training will be determined, to a great extent, on the contribution of the Army National Guard as perceived by the Active Army. Perceptions of the Army National Guard held by the Active Army, were obtained by surveying resident students of the Army War College, class of 1992. Attitudes concerning the Army National Guard's ability to mobilize, deploy, and effectively participate in an armed conflict, both as individual Guardsman and as units was surveyed from several perspectives. In addition, recommendations to improve the "One Army" concept, expectations the Active Army has of the Army National Guard; and what the Army National Guard can expect from the Active Army were solicited.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

Approximately eighteen years had elapsed between the announcement of the Total Force Policy by then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and the release of a white paper entitled "The Army's Strategic Issues" in which the new Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Gordon R. Sullivan announced as his fourth strategic issue "to more completely *integrate the Total Force*." In that span of time the Army has responded to a number of crises the most recent of which, and the most controversial from a "Total Force" perspective, is Desert Storm. The controversy centers around the activation of three Army National Guard armor brigades designed and trained to "round out" active duty Army divisions, and prompted such headlines as "Guard vs. Army: Bad blood is boiling"<sup>1</sup> and "Fallout over unreadiness dogs Guard".<sup>2</sup> Without a doubt such controversy will spawn a great number of articles supporting the viewpoint of those who both support, and defend against dramatic cuts in the force structure of the Army National Guard.

Even critics of the Army National Guards' armor brigades, however believe that the Guards' artillery units and combat service support units

that were activated for and served in Desert Storm performed in an acceptable manner. Why then were there no National Guard General Officer commands such as the 167th Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Alabama Army National Guard or the 213th Medical Brigade, Mississippi Army National Guard, both commanded by Army National Guard General Officers and both, under the Capstone program, designed to provide the wartime support for the VII Corps?

In its Desert Storm After Action Review, the 2d Corps Support Command which provided the combat service support for the VII Corp and was manned during a peacetime environment to integrate into the 167th COSCOM in a wartime environment, noted that "The Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) of the 2d COSCOM Headquarters, the 800th Corps Materiel Management Center, and the 229th Movement Control Center are insufficient to support wartime missions". Clearly, the 167th COSCOM with its Materiel Management Center and Movement Control Center as well as the 213th Medical Brigade should have been activated in support of VII Corps as called for and practised under the Capstone program. Why were they not?

Is it, as Colonel Charles E. Heller pointed out in his report entitled "The New Military Strategy and its impact on the Reserve Components"<sup>3</sup>

that "Enough of the AC has absorbed the negativism toward the RC of Emory Upton that it will take a significant change in attitudes through Army Staff emphasis, formal education and personnel assignments to make any positive inroads toward integration"?

The purpose of this report is to examine the attitudes of those Active Army officers currently attending the United States Army War College towards the Army National Guard and to promulgate their recommendations to improve the "One Army" concept, the expectations they have of the Army National Guard; and what the Army National Guard can expect from them.

As the senior leadership of the Army of tomorrow, these individuals will be in positions which will require them to work with the Army National Guard, train the Army National Guard, and perhaps even decide which Army National Guard units will or will not participate with them in combat in the next crisis. Their perceptions of the roles and capabilities of the Army National Guard were shaped during Desert Storm and will be refined throughout the balance of their careers.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Bernard E. Trainor, "Guard vs. Army: Bad blood is boiling" The Atlanta Journal & Constitution 5 May 1991.
2. Genevieve Anton, "Fallout over unreadiness dogs Guard" The Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph 12 January 1992.
3. Charles E. Heller, "The New Military Strategy and its impact on the Reserve Components", USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 7, 1991, p. 28.

## CHAPTER TWO

### DEMOGRAPHICS

The survey instrument was drafted in September 1991 and mailed to the U. S. Army War College for review in October 1991. Because two War College resident students, COL Robert L. Cooch, Jr. and LTC Jack R. Fox, had submitted surveys addressing Reserve Component issues, the three were combined into one survey. A total of one-hundred and fourteen (114) Active U. S. Army responses were received representing an approximate 57% return of Active U. S. Army resident War College students. Other resident students responded however, for the purposes of this study, their responses were not included in the results. Basic information such as branch, source of commissioning, rank, etc., was obtained in order to ensure a representative sample of the student body was obtained.

Most (55.263%) respondents were combat arms officers. Combat Support accounted for 18.421% of the responses; Combat Service Support for 21.053% of the responses; while Health Services and Other accounted for the remaining 5.263% of the responses.

Most respondents (61.404%) received their commissions through the



Reserve Officers Training Corps program. The United States Military Academy and Officer Candidate Schools represented 15.789% and 14.035%, respectively. Direct commissioning accounted for 7.018%, while State Academy Officer Candidate Schools accounted for only 1.754%.

Fully 79.824% were either Lieutenant Colonels or Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) with the remaining 20.175% holding the rank of Colonel.

In order to ensure that the sample population corresponded to the student population, a memorandum was obtained from the War College and the sample population demographics heretofore discussed were compared with those provided by the College and found to correspond.

The extent of interaction between the Active Army and the Army National Guard was determined by questioning the Active Army respondents about their contact with the Army National Guard as advisors, members of a Readiness Group, evaluators, or by participation with the Army National Guard in "Just Cause", "Desert Shield/Storm", the National Training Center, etc.

Less than two per cent of the respondents had ever been assigned to the Army National Guard either as an advisor or as a member of a Readiness Group. But almost two-thirds (65.789%) had been assigned to evaluate a National Guard unit during its annual training period. Close to

23% of those surveyed had never worked with the Army National Guard.

Respondents indicated that they had participated with the Army National Guard in the following:

Just Cause	3.5%
Desert Shield	27.2%
Desert Storm	32.5%
Provide Comfort	3.5%
NTC	11.4%
Other	49.1%

Because a respondent could select more than one of the choices listed the percentages do not total 100%.

Once the demographic information had been obtained, a series of sixteen questions were asked to ascertain the attitude of the Active Army officer towards the Army National Guard as an institution, towards the Guards' ability to provide trained and ready units and individuals, and towards the Guards' future roles.

The survey concluded with three open ended questions on how to improve the working relationship between the Active Army and the Army National Guard and what each partner in the "One Army" could expect from the other.

## CHAPTER 3

### ATTITUDES

Several statements used in the "Attitudes" section were statements taken from a study entitled "Active Force Perceptions of the Air Reserve" modified to pertain to the Army National Guard. The response format used was to present a statement, then have the respondent select one of the following: "Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree"

What does the Active Component officer think of the individuals serving in the Army National Guard? In an election year, when voters are faced with a democratic candidate for President who has been accused of being a draft dodger because he avoided service and a republican candidate for Vice President who served in the National Guard during this same period, the press has tended to treat both these situations as negatives, properly or improperly, thus implying that service in the National Guard is or was equivalent to draft dodging. Also, remarks by the Secretary of Defense in justifying the cuts in strength of the National Guard to Congress tend to support the supposition that the Guard is a "haven for retirement pay seekers" when Mr. Cheney stated that "We're not a social welfare agency, we're not an employment agency, and we're not an agency

that's operated on the basis of what makes sense for some member of Congress back home in the district,"<sup>2</sup>. The survey results indicate that while 56.14% disagree with the statement that "All too often the National Guard has tended to be a 'social club' or a haven for retirement pay seekers, draft dodgers, and the like.", fully 43.86% do not disagree with it. In the *Air Reserve* study previously cited nearly two-thirds of the respondents disagreed with this perception. It would seem that the decision not to deploy the Guard's armor brigades not only affected the public's perception but those of the Active Army as well.

When asked if the individual Guardsmen was adequately trained to make a positive contribution from the first day of their activation 48.214% responded that they were not, 18.75% were neutral, and 33.036% felt they were adequately trained.

There was a strong belief (87.719%) that the individual Guardsmen would report for duty in response to a mobilization order. Not surprising in light of the recent Desert Shield/Storm experience.

What was surprising, however, was the response to a similar question directed towards unit mobilization. Almost half (49.557%) of the respondents agreed that "Rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard roundout brigades has proven to be impossible." From the responses to this question, it appears that either the respondents have doubts about the

Guards ability to mobilize it's units (which seems unlikely in view of the respondents belief that the individual Guardsmen would report for duty in response to a mobilization order), or that the term "mobilization" which means the activating of all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel<sup>3</sup> might have been confused with the term "deployment" which means "the relocation of forces to desired areas of operations."<sup>4</sup> The latter is probably the case in light of the fact that those roundout brigades which received so much attention during Operation Desert Shield/Storm did mobilize rapidly but were not deployed, for reasons this survey was not designed to address

Other questions dealing with mobilization and deployment dealt with legal and political constraints and the ability of Guard units to rapidly deploy and integrate into the Active Army and were taken from the *Air Reserve* study. Would legal constraints delay the rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard? Slightly over 42% felt that legal constraints would not delay the rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard, however, 31.579% were neutral and the remaining 26.316% agreed that legal constraints would delay the rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard. Since the legal bases for mobilizing the Reserves, including the Army National Guard, are clear, the results appear to substantiate the need for additional education about the Reserve Components in general and the

Army National Guard specifically.

The majority of respondents agree that political constraints will probably delay the rapid mobilization of Army National Guard units. A majority also believe that the Army National Guard should not be at the same level of readiness as the active forces.

Is the National Guard structured properly to be rapidly integrated into the Active Army during a war or national crisis? Yes, said 47.368%. No or neutral respondents split the remaining 52.632% evenly with 26.316% for each.

Most (54.386%) of the active component officers surveyed felt that some missions traditionally reposed in the active Army can be shifted to the Army National Guard with little or no loss of capability, however, when asked later in the questionnaire if the greatly increased warning time of conventional conflict in Europe increasingly allows the heavy armor mission to be shifted to the Army National Guard an even more impressive 71.428% felt that the heavy armor mission was not one of those missions.

A series of questions was asked dealing with how well and how often the active Army and the Army National Guard work together. The majority of respondents felt:

1. That the Regular Army Capstone/Roundout Headquarters did strive

to make their National Guard Capstone/Roundout units an important part of their command and;

- 2 That the more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the better their coordination will be with the Guard and,
- 3 That the more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the more they value the Guard and finally,
4. Active Army personnel have to be more involved with the Army National Guard.

The last set of questions pertaining to attitude dealt with the ability of the National Guard to make its' voice known in the force structure arena and the amount of political influence the active Army perceives the National Guard can exert with the United States Congress. Most active Army respondents did not know if the National Guard Bureau had an adequate voice in force structure development as evidenced by a 55.263% neutral response. There was, however, no doubt in their minds that the National Guard was able to exert a great deal of influence over the U. S. Congress with 90.091% responding that the Guard had more influence over Congress than the Active Army.

## ENDNOTES

1. Ball, Gerald D., and Bush, Frederick E. Jr. Active Force Perceptions of the Air Reserve. Ed. Bennie J. Wilson III. Washington, DC. National Defense University Press, 1985.
2. "The Reserve-cut furor" Boston Globe 28 March 1992, page 18.
3. "Mobilization - (DOD)" Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1 December 1989.
4. "Deployment - (DOD, NATO)" Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1 December 1989.



## CHAPTER 4

### EXPECTATIONS AND THE 'ONE ARMY' CONCEPT

Responses to the question, "What can be done to improve the 'One Army' concept?" centered around three areas: training; education; and integration/structure changes. Several other recommendations were also mentioned.

More training days was recommended for the Guard. In addition, respondents recommended that the Active Army and the Guard train together and integrate their training exercises. Make standards the same and find a better way to evaluate, not the 1-R were both themes which appear repeatedly.

Making the pre-command course (PCC) a requirement for Guard battalion and brigade commanders was recommended and education at every level for officers and NCOs in the Guard was espoused.

Suggestions enabling the Active Army and the Guard to work better together included: integrating Active Component Officers into the National Guard; developing unity of command; developing one system to automate the personnel systems between the Guard, the USAR, and the Active Army; exchange programs lasting 2 -4 weeks; and inclusion of the

Guard as full players in planning and programming actions. In addition, some would restructure the Guard with the majority of their force in combat support and combat service support to reduce the combat structure. Some recommended that the Guard combat units, specifically infantry and armor, would have their level of organization limited to company size.

Other recommendations candidly reflect the ongoing debate about force structure. "NG should quit saying they want to be part of the 'One Army' then going directly to Congress as if it were a separate entity." Another, "'One Army' is a myth. There is a natural friction which needs to be recognized. The RA has an ego and the RC is too politicized. We're putting superb soldiers on the street because of the RC political maneuvering and concern more for their welfare than for the defense of America. We are further apart then ever." One respondent suggested, "Make the Adjutant Generals of the states Brigadier Generals and give the CJCS or Army CSA the ability to appoint them. The Guards' Generals are political hacks 75% of the time and are not warfighters. They cause most of the problems in Army-Guard relationships."

In a partnership, each partner expects certain things from the other partner, so the question was asked, "What should the Active Army reasonably expect from the Army National Guard?" The majority view was

properly trained, organized and equipped professionals who are ready to fight at M+(0 - 90). The second most quoted response was "respect, trust, and above all, honesty." A small minority expressed a desire to either do away with the National Guard as a separate component altogether or to use them only as combat arms fillers to active units - not fully prepared independent units.

And in return, the Guard should expect from the Active Army honest I-R evaluations that can be used to focus home station training; advice and assistance in the form of expertise, training assistance, and professional treatment; support in the form of funding, equipment and personnel i.e., officers and NCOs; full integration into all planning, training exercises and operations; and finally, fair treatment in the distribution of equipment and materiel. Again, there was a small minority who voiced the opinion that the Guard should expect "Suspicion" and "...reluctance of Active Army leaders to accept them as equals" and "When an all volunteer force is asked to cut the muscle out of our organization, the NG should expect resentment and distrust of their true motives."

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This survey tends to support Colonel Heller's contention that, "it will take a significant change in attitudes through Army Staff emphasis, formal education and personnel assignments to make any positive inroads toward integration."<sup>1</sup> In addition, increasing the amount of time the Active Army and the Army National Guard plan for and train together would be of great benefit. Ultimately, the way to integrate is to train together and, if and when the time comes, to fight together.

The experience of the Guards artillery brigades and its Combat Service Support units deployed to Southwest Asia is a case in point. Because these units were deployed and because the Guards armor brigades were not deployed, the perception is that the Guard can handle the Combat Support and Combat Service Support but not the Combat missions.

Finally, the responses support the need for formal education concerning the history and role of the Army National Guard throughout the Active Army officers career.

## ENDNOTES

1. Charles E. Heller, "The New Military Strategy and its impact on the Reserve Components", USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 7, 1991, p. 28.

## EXTRACT OF USAWC SURVEY WITH RESPONSES

### 1. What is your primary branch?

55.263%	Combat Arms
18.421	Combat Support
21.053	Combat Service Support
3.509	Health Services
1.754	Other

### 2. Source of Commission:

15.789%	USMA
61.404	ROTC
14.035	OCS
1.754	State Academy OCS
7.018	Direct Commission

### 3. Years of Service:

Mean:	21.198
Median	21
Mode	22
Minimum	14.5
Maximum	27

### 4. What is your current rank?

24.561%	LTC
55.263	LTC (P)
20.175	COL

### 5. Have you ever been assigned to the Army National Guard either as an advisor or as a member of a Readiness Group?

1.754%	Yes
98.246	No

### 6. Have you ever been assigned to evaluate a National Guard unit during its annual training period?

65.789%	Yes
34.211	No

7. Have you ever served in a Regular Army unit that had a National Guard Roundout or Roundup unit?

41.228% Yes

58.772 No

8. Were you ever a member of a National Guard or Army Reserve Unit prior to coming on active duty as a Regular Army officer?

4.386% Yes

95.614 No

9. Did you work with Army National Guard units during:  
(Check all that apply)

3.509% Just Cause

27.193 Desert Shield

32.456 Desert Storm

3.509 Provide Comfort

11.404 National Training Center

49.123 Other

22.807 Never worked with the Army National Guard

NOTE: Since more than one block could be checked, these percentages do not total 100%

10. All too often the National Guard has tended to be a "social club" or a haven for retirement pay seekers, draft dodgers, and the like.

10.526 Strongly Disagree

45.614 Disagree

27.193 Neutral

15.789 Agree

.877 Strongly Agree

11. National Guardsmen are, for the most part, adequately trained to make a positive contribution from the first day of their activation.

5.357 Strongly Disagree

42.857 Disagree

18.75 Neutral

31.25 Agree

1.786 Strongly Agree

12. Some missions traditionally reposed in the active Army can be shifted to the Army National Guard with little or no loss of capability.

5.263	Strongly Disagree
24.561	Disagree
15.789	Neutral
46.491	Agree
7.895	Strongly Agree

13. The Army National Guard should be at the same level of readiness and be able to deploy as quickly as the active forces

19.298	Strongly Disagree
59.649	Disagree
6.14	Neutral
14.035	Agree
877	Strongly Agree

14. Rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard roundout brigades has proven to be impossible.

1.77	Strongly Disagree
23.894	Disagree
24.779	Neutral
38.053	Agree
11.504	Strongly Agree

15. I am confident that most (90%) National Guardsmen will report for duty in response to a mobilization order.

1.754	Strongly Disagree
4.386	Disagree
6.14	Neutral
56.14	Agree
31.579	Strongly Agree



16. Legal constraints will probably delay the rapid mobilization of the Army National Guard.

4.386	Strongly Disagree
37.719	Disagree
31.579	Neutral
25.439	Agree
877	Strongly Agree

17. National Guard units are structured to be rapidly integrated into the Active Army during a war or national crisis.

2.632	Strongly Disagree
23.684	Disagree
26.316	Neutral
42.982	Agree
4.386	Strongly Agree

18. Political constraints will probably delay the rapid mobilization of Army National Guard units.

1.77	Strongly Disagree
26.549	Disagree
20.354	Neutral
42.476	Agree
8.65	Strongly Agree

19. The Regular Army Capstone/Roundout Headquarters strive to make their National Guard Capstone/Roundout units an important part of their command.

877	Strongly Disagree
14.035	Disagree
29.625	Neutral
50	Agree
5.263	Strongly Agree

20. The more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the better their coordination with the Guard.

0	Strongly Disagree
4.966	Disagree
1.754	Neutral
71.93	Agree
21.93	Strongly Agree

21. The more knowledge Army leaders have about the National Guard, the more they value the Guard.

0	Strongly Disagree
7.018	Disagree
23.684	Neutral
57.018	Agree
12.281	Strongly Agree

22. National Guard Bureau has an adequate voice in force structure development.

0	Strongly Disagree
8.772	Disagree
55.263	Neutral
28.07	Agree
7.895	Strongly Agree

23. Active Army personnel have to be more involved with the Army National Guard.

1.77	Strongly Disagree
7.08	Disagree
15.929	Neutral
58.407	Agree
16.814	Strongly Agree

24. The greatly increased warning time of conventional conflict in Europe increasingly allows the heavy armor mission to be shifted to the Army National Guard.

23,214	Strongly Disagree
48,214	Disagree
15,179	Neutral
125	Agree
893	Strongly Agree

25. As compared with the Active Army, how much influence does the National Guard exert with the United States Congress?

67,566	<u>Much more</u> than Active Army
22,523	A little <u>more</u> than Active Army
6,306	About <u>the same</u> as Active Army
3,604	A little <u>less</u> than Active Army
0	<u>Much less</u> than Active Army

26. What can be done to improve the "One Army" concept?

a. Training

- (1) More training days for the National Guard
- (2) Train together more
- (3) Make standards the same
- (4) Integrated training exercises
- (5) Find a better way to evaluate, not the 1-P

b. Education

- (1) Make PCC a requirement for RC Bn/Bde Cdrs
- (2) Education at every level for officers and NCOs on the RC

c. Integration/Structure Changes

- (1) Integrate Active Component Officers into the National Guard
- (2) Unity of command
- (3) In all planning and programming actions, include the RC as full players -- still today we often continue to operate without RC involvement at the beginning.
- (4) We need one system to automate the personnel systems between guard, reserve and RA
- (5) Brief exchange programs lasting 2 - 4 weeks would help
- (6) Restructure NG and Reserve units with majority of their force in CS/CSS and reduce the cdt structure.
- (7) Limit the highest level of organization of combat units, specifically infantry and armor, to company.

d. Other Recommendations

- (1) A more realistic expectation about readiness levels Guard units should be able to maintain give their limited training time and facilities.
- (2) We can stop talking about it, and develop achievable goal, then commit to those goals. Otherwise the thing is a joke
- (3) Take the politics and Congress out of the Total Army force structure AC/RC mix business.
- (4) The Active Army component leaders (i.e., General Officers) must change their attitudes and perceptions of RC officers
- (5) NG should quit saying they want to be part of the "One Army" then going directly to Congress as if it were a separate entity

- (6) Although not rampant, there is too much politics and protective incompetents within the HQ. It only hurts the good ones who are in the majority.
- (7) Nothing. "One Army" is a myth. There is a natural friction which needs to be recognized. The PA has an ego and the PG is too politicized. We're putting superb soldiers on the street because of the PG political maneuvering and concern more for their welfare than for the defense of America. We are further apart than ever.
- (8) Make the Adjutant Generals of the states Brigadier Generals and give the CJCS or Army CSA the ability to appoint them. The Guards' Generals are political hacks 75% of the time and are not warfighters. They cause most of the problems in Army-Guard relationships.

27. What should the Active Army reasonably expect from the Army National Guard?

- a. Properly trained, organized and equipped professionals who are ready to fight at M+ [0 - 90]. (Majority view)
- b. Respect, trust, and above all, honesty (Second most quoted)
- c. Combat arms fillers to active units - not fully prepared independent units. (Individuals views from here to end of question)
- d. Only state police for governor. Need to get rid of National Guard as a separate component.
- e. Stop the charade of combat arms battalions (except artillery and engineer) in reserve component. They cannot master synchronization on a part time basis.
- f. Expect to get out of shape, poorly trained soldiers once mobilized

28. What should the Army National Guard reasonably expect from the Active Army?

- a. Honest 1-R evaluations that can be used to focus home station training.
- b. Advice and assistance in the form of expertise, training assistance, and professional treatment.
- c. Support in the form of funding, equipment and personnel i.e., officers and NCOs
- d. To be fully integrated into all planning, training exercises and operations.
- e. To receive fair treatment in the distribution of equipment and materiel

- f. Suspicion: While the CG and CSS Guard units are very good at RI-Day, the combat units aren't even close. Perhaps by design. Unless plans begin to reflect reality, the Active Army will look at the Guard with doubts as to their capability.
- g. The ARNG should expect the reluctance of Active Army leaders to accept them as equals. However, the NG must be resilient and persevere. The Active Army need the ARNG, especially during this era of downsizing and uncertainty.
- h. When an all volunteer force is asked to cut the muscle out of our organization, the NG should expect resentment and distrust of their true motives.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ball, Gerald D., and Bush, Frederick E. Jr. Active Force Perceptions of the Air Reserve. Ed. Bennie J. Wilson III. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985.

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